

May, 1983 Volume 11, No. 5

FOCUS

How Washington Won Chicago



The Emergency Jobs Bill: Who Does It Help?



Declining Black Land Ownership



Joint Center for Political Studies

Perspective

Professor Robert Dahl tells us how minority groups traditionally make their way into the American mainstream. They often begin in a condition of powerlessness, move into protest, then into political participation, and finally into economic empowerment.

For blacks, the period of powerlessness is not hard to identify. The decade of the sixties is often characterized as a period of protest; the seventies, as one of substantial political participation.

During the seventies, the number of black elected officials increased from fewer than a thousand to over five thousand. Black voters had a major impact on numerous elections. And in 1976, the black vote provided the margin of victory for Jimmy Carter.

Blacks also appeared to be headed toward a greater degree of economic empowerment in the late seventies. But two critical developments derailed their progress. One was the recession. Just as blacks sought a larger piece of the economic pie, the pie started to shrink for everybody. The second development was the election of a conservative Republican administration, which believed that the best way to solve the nation's economic problems was to cut the budgets of social programs and to reduce federal enforcement of affirmative action laws and regulations. The result of both changes was to impede, if not set back, the quest for justice and equality.

Thus, the 1980s began with blacks feeling their backs against the wall. They were prevented from moving on to the next phase of their development, economic empowerment. Like water that is suddenly dammed, the hopes and aspirations of blacks welled up into a great wave of political activism. Cut off from the economic mainstream, black Americans intensified their efforts in the political arena, hoping to use their political toehold to further their economic interests.

New Census Bureau figures show that 43.0 percent of black respondents reported voting in 1982, a *jump of 5.8 percent* over the 37.2 percent reported in 1978. The gap between black and white turnout is now 6.9 percent, the narrowest gap ever recorded. Between 1980 and 1982, there was a net increase of 573,000 in black voter registration, showing the impact of grassroots voter mobilization efforts. At least a half million more were added in 1982-83.

In 1982, black turnout increased by 4.8 percent in the South, compared to a 1.8 percent increase in white turnout. The most dramatic gains were in the North and West, where black turnout went up by 7.2 percent over the 1978 level, as compared to a 3.1 percent gain among whites. Black turnout actually exceeded white turnout by a whopping 9.8 percent in Illinois, where the massive black registration drive preceding Harold Washington's mayoralty bid unexpectedly turned the Thompson-Stevenson governor's race into a squeaker. In eight other states, blacks outdid whites in voter participation: California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

Recent discussions about the possibility of a black candidate entering the 1984 Democratic primaries reveal another aspect of the new political aggressiveness in the black community. Such aggressiveness is fueled by the Chicago results and by the prospects of a victory by Wilson Goode over Frank Rizzo in the Philadelphia mayoral primary. It is also fueled by the prospect of black candidates vying for the mayor's seat in Boston and Denver.

Blacks are, in effect, returning to step three in the movement toward economic empowerment. We are consolidating and expanding on the political gains of the seventies, so that in the future, no one will be able to stymie our progress toward full equality. Having gained a measure of political power, we must now convert that power into a force that will propel us into the American mainstream.

Eddie N. Williams
President

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How Washington Won Chicago

by Thomas E. Cavanagh

(Mr. Cavanagh is a research associate at the Joint Center.)

Chicago's election of Congressman Harold Washington as its mayor concluded an intensely emotional political crusade by blacks in a city with a tradition of rough-and-tumble politics and a history of racial polarization. Electing a black mayor in one of the most segregated cities in America posed a major strategic challenge, which proved excruciatingly difficult to overcome. To win the primary, Washington had to maximize his black support while hoping the white vote would split evenly between his two white opponents. To win the general election, on the other hand, Washington had to expand well beyond his black base to pick up about 20 percent of the white vote.

The Stage Is Set

The changing racial composition of the city's population was the key factor in making a black mayoral candidacy viable. By 1980, Chicago's black population stood at just under 40 percent of the city's total, while Hispanics constituted 14 percent. Meanwhile, the white proportion had dropped from 66 percent to just under 50 percent between 1970 and 1980.

The performance of the incumbent mayor was another factor. Jane Byrne had alienated a large part of the city's electorate. Blacks resented her arbitrary replacement of black officials in the city's housing authority and school board with whites; many of her other actions and statements were regarded as insensitive or insulting. But her support had eroded among virtually all segments of the electorate. Thus, not only were blacks receptive to a black candidacy, but a strong white challenger emerged as well, in the person of state's attorney Richard M. Daley. And, largely because of Mayor Byrne's alienating politics, the city's vaunted machine failed to deliver the support she needed to stave off serious challenges.

These factors paved the way for a strong mayoral bid by a black candidate. When community leaders urged Harold Washington to run for mayor in 1983, he said he would consider doing so only if at least 50,000 blacks were added to the voter rolls by November 1982.

A massive voter registration drive was launched under the umbrella of POWER (People Organized for Welfare and Employment Rights), a broad-based coalition of grass-roots community groups formed in June 1982 to protest cutbacks in state General Assistance grants. POWER conducted voter registration at AFDC, welfare, and unemployment offices in September and October. Financial muscle was provided by Edward and Bettianne Gardner, the owners of Soft Sheen, who donated $200,000 to pay for a saturation poster campaign.

A major vehicle for the registration drive was black radio, which proved to be an inexpensive and effective way to counteract the lack of black political news in the major city media. Talk shows and soul music deejays stressed the importance of registering and voting. Popular black radio personality Lu Palmer was even taken off the air briefly because of his broadcast cheerleading for the voting drive. (Palmer is now running for Washington's congressional seat.) In a campaign called "Come Alive on October 5," over 100,000 blacks reportedly registered to vote in a single day. Overall black registration increased by at least 150,000 between 1982 and 1983.

The results were dramatically evident in November, when the unexpectedly large turnout of black voters in Chicago threw all of the pollsters' projections awry and left the governor's race a virtual dead heat. As a "can-do" sentiment surged through the black community, Washington's candidacy became a foregone conclusion, and he announced on November 10.

The Primary Campaign

It was one thing to declare for office and quite another to solidify black support. Early polls showed Washington pulling only about half of the black vote. His past legal problems aroused skepticism among blacks that a black candidate with a spotted legal record could attract enough white votes to be a serious contender. Thus, shoring up Washington's black base was the first order of business.

The theme of racial pride received its first important airing at an appearance before a nearly all-black audience at Bethel A.M.E. Church on Sunday, November 14. "We've been giving white candidates our votes for years and years and years, unstintingly, hoping that they would include us in the process, deep-seatedly knowing that they probably would not," said the congressman.

"And so now it's come to the point where we say, 'Well, it's our turn. It's our turn.' And we don't have to make any excuses for it. You don't even have to explain it.

"I am not stupid. I understand how the world is made, and I know there are problems in some other communities. We're going to reach out for them, but this is the base. This is the base. We don't have to be ashamed of it."

The phrase "It's our turn" would come back to haunt Washington in the general election, but it proved enormously useful in building a black political base for the primary.

The media played an important role throughout the campaign. In the primary, both major Chicago dailies, the *Tribune* and the *Sun-Times*, endorsed Daley and subjected Byrne's controversial record to intense scrutiny. Meanwhile, Washington's past was generally forgotten, as the press viewed his campaign as largely symbolic and non-threatening. A content analysis of newspaper coverage by Professor Doris Graber of the University of Illinois concluded that coverage of Byrne was largely negative, Daley coverage was mixed, and Washington coverage surprisingly positive before the primary.

But the televised debates were the turning point in the campaign. Washington emerged as articulate,

(Continued on page 7)

The Emergency Jobs Bill: Who Does It Help?

by Julianne Malveaux

(Dr. Malveaux is professor of economics at San Francisco State University.)

In March 1983, President Reagan signed into law the Emergency Jobs Bill, legislation that will provide $4.6 billion to help the unemployed and the disadvantaged get through the recession. Most of the funds—nearly $3 billion of the $4.6 billion appropriation—will be used for public works construction such as mass transit development, library and hospital repairs, and park improvements. Another $500 million will be used for humanitarian aid—food and shelter, maternal/child health, and community and Indian health services; $400 million, for jobs and education; and $500 million, for general economic and local aid.

The legislation was passed in response to the rapid increase in the unemployment rate over the past two years—from an annual rate of 7.4 percent in 1981 to 9.9 percent in 1982. In March 1983, the unemployment rate was 10.3 percent. Black unemployment was more than twice the level of white unemployment through 1982. The 1982 unemployment rate for whites was 8.6 percent; for blacks, it was 18.9 percent.

As high as these rates are, they are low estimates of joblessness. In 1982, some 526,000 blacks were "discouraged workers"—unemployed persons who have given up trying to find work. If these discouraged workers had been included, the 1982 unemployment rate for blacks would have been 22.5 percent. Among whites, there were more than a million discouraged workers. Had these workers been included, the white unemployment rate would have been 9.6. Thus, including discouraged workers increases the black unemployment rate more than the white unemployment rate, because proportionately more blacks have stopped looking for work.

The Emergency Jobs Bill will provide approximately 400,000 jobs. But with 11.4 million unemployed as of March 1983, the jobs created would reduce the unemployment rate only slightly, from 10.3 percent to 9.9 percent. In fact, the unemployment rate might remain above 9.9 percent, if some of the jobs are filled by those not currently counted in the labor force.

Components of the Emergency Jobs Bill

	Amount allocated ($1,000,000s)	Percent of total
Humanitarian Aid	**544**	**11.8**
Food and shelter	100	2.2
Surplus food dist.	75	1.6
Maternal/child health	105	2.3
Food to pregnant women	100	2.2
Community health services	70	1.5
Indian health services	94	2.0
Jobs, Education	**430.9**	**9.4**
Summer youth employment	100	2.2
Dislocated workers	85	1.8
Jobs for the elderly	37.5	0.8
Job Corps	32.4	0.7
Benefits for railway workers	126	2.7
College work study	50	1.1
Economic Aid	**200**	**4.3**
Economic development administration grants	100	2.2
Small business grants and loans	100	2.2
Local Aid	**250**	**5.4**
Social service block grants	225	4.9
Community service block grants	25	0.5
Public Works	**2,942**	**64.0**
Community development block grants	1,000	21.7
Water project construction	545	11.8
Rural water and waste	150	3.3
Soil conservation and flood control	100	2.2
Military housing construction	180	3.9
School construction near military bases	60	1.3
Mass transit	132	2.9
Railroad improvements	80	1.7
Federal building repairs	125	2.7
Federal prison repairs	80	1.7
Veterans Hospital repairs	75	1.6
National park improvements	90	2.0
National forest improvements	60	1.3
Urban park repairs	25	0.5
Weather proofing for low-income homes, buildings	150	3.3
Removing barriers to the handicapped	40	0.9
Library construction	50	1.1
Other spending	233.1	5.1
Total	**4,600**	**100.0**

Source: *Employment and Earnings*, U.S. Department of Labor, January 1983.

Who Will the Emergency Jobs Bill Benefit?

Nearly two thirds of the funds are allocated for public works construction, which includes projects ranging from environmental improvements to repairing federal prison facilities. Thus, the legislation favors construction workers.

A case can be made for creating jobs for those in construction. In January 1983, unemployment in craft occupations exceeded the average unemployment rate by almost 20 percent. But unemployment in some other occupations was even higher. Unemployment rates for laborers and operators were more than 80 percent higher than the average unemployment rates in January 1983. While some of these workers will be used in the public works projects, most new jobs will go to craft workers.

Creating construction jobs will not significantly reduce black unemployment, since black workers are underrepresented in the job categories that will benefit most from the legislation—precision production, craft, and repair workers. Blacks comprise 11.7 percent of the labor force, but they are not evenly distributed across occupations. Sixteen percent of all operative (that is, manufacturing) and laborer jobs but only 8.4 percent of all craft jobs are held by blacks. Thus, blacks will gain proportionately less than whites from the Emergency Jobs Bill.

If jobs are created in proportion to the allocation of funds, we can estimate that 252,000 public works

Employment, by race, 1981 and 1982 (in millions of individuals)

Black	1981	1982	Change
Labor Force	11,086	11,331	245
Unemployed	1,731	2,142	411
Unemployment rate	15.6%	18.9%	3.3
Discouraged workers	353	526	173
Adjusted unemployment rate	18.2%	22.5%	4.3
White			
Labor Force	95,052	96,143	1,091
Unemployed	6,343	8,241	1,898
Unemployment rate	6.7%	8.6%	1.9
Discouraged workers	751	1,042	291
Adjusted unemployment rate	7.4%	9.6%	2.2

Source: *Employment and Earnings*, U.S. Department of Labor, January 1983.

jobs will be created. If one laborer job is created for every two craft jobs, about 84,000 laborer jobs and 168,000 craft jobs will be created. Given past black employment patterns in these occupations, black workers will fill 14,100 craft jobs and 13,500 laborer jobs. White workers will fill the remaining 224,400 jobs. The black unemployment rate would drop from 18.9 to 18.7 percent, a decrease of 1.1 percent. The white unemployment rate would drop from 8.6 to 8.3 percent, or 2.4 percent. Thus, the white unemployment rate will be reduced more by the bill.

Benefits Other Than Jobs

There may, however, be other benefits of particular importance to blacks. The Emergency Jobs Bill contains provisions to allocate funds to cities, counties, and states with the highest unemployment rates. For example, 27 states and the District of Columbia have run out of money to pay unemployment insurance benefits, and $5 billion will replenish a federal loan fund that is available to states unable to pay their share of unemployment benefits. This should prove beneficial to blacks, since their unemployment rate is so high.

Public works programs that will significantly benefit black communities include the weather-proofing program for low-income homes, schools, and hospitals, for which $150 million is proposed.


The jobs and education component of the Emergency Jobs Bill (i.e., Summer Youth Employment, Job Corps, and subsidized jobs for the elderly) will probably benefit black workers, since more black youth and elderly qualify for subsidized jobs. But this segment of the legislation accounts for less than 10 percent of the allocated funds.

Funds for humanitarian aid and for local aid (social and community services block grants) will preserve jobs in social service programs, which have been imperiled by previous budget cuts.

In summary, the Emergency Jobs Bill provides no special relief for black unemployment. The shortcomings of the bill demonstrate the limitations of short-term employment legislation that is not targeted at disadvantaged minorities. During both recovery and recession, black unemployment rates have been double those of whites. The Emergency Jobs Bill will not help close the gap between black and white unemployment rates and may even widen it, because employment relief is focused on sectors of the workforce in which blacks are underrepresented.

To have an impact on the special employment problems of blacks and thus on the disproportionately high black unemployment rate, legislation would have to be targeted more carefully to the occupational distribution of blacks. Better enforcement of affirmative action could also reduce the gap between black and white employment rates. And, in the long run, the underlying reasons for the different occupational distribution of blacks and whites need to be examined and addressed.

Occupational breakdown of the labor force



Occupation	Unemployment rate*
Managerial and professional	3.9
Technical, sales, and support	7.3
Service occupations	11.8
Production, craft, and repair	13.6
Operators, fabricators, and laborers	20.6
Farming, forestry, and fishing	13.4

SOURCE: *Employment and Earnings*, U.S. Department of Labor, January 1983

* Not seasonally adjusted.

The Decline in Black Landownership

by Joseph F. Brooks

(The author is president of the Emergency Land Fund. For further information on the subject of black landownership, contact the fund at 564 Lee Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30310; telephone 404 758-5506.)

Landownership in America is concentrated in very few hands. Only 3 percent of the population owns 95 percent of all private land. In the southeastern United States alone, the paper and timber industry acquires 250,000 acres each year. Just two paper and timber companies, Georgia-Pacific and Weyerhaeuser, together own over 12 million acres—more land than black America owns collectively. Such a concentration of ownership breeds monopoly, feeds inflation, undermines competition and thus results in higher prices, and perhaps most important, controls the political and economic destiny of our society.

Recent Trends in Black Landownership

One out of every 25 black Americans has a land interest in the South. But blacks are losing 500,000 acres of farmland, worth an estimated $250 million, each year.

During the 10-year period ending in 1978, blacks lost 57 percent of their active farmland. In 1969, blacks held 133,000 operating farms—6.2 million acres; by 1978, black ownership had fallen to 57,000 farms—4.2 million acres. The 2 million acres lost during these 10 years are valued at $1 billion or more.

This is only part of the picture. The figures above are from the U.S. Census of Agriculture, which counts only *active* farmland—land that produces an income for its owners of at least $1,000 a year in farm sales. A study conducted recently by the Emergency Land Fund found that in 1978, blacks actually owned or had access to 9.5 million acres, some 5 million acres more than that counted by the Census Bureau. As many as 1.6 million blacks who live outside the South own land in the rural Southeast.

But this "unaccounted land" held by blacks is often idle and is often held by absentee owners. Or it is occupied by elderly individuals who are often on public assistance and have little contact with their urban dwelling offspring. In many cases, the owners can barely read or write, yet they are encumbered with complicated land titles, taxes, partitions, and foreclosure sales. Thus, much of this land is prey to land speculators.

Why Are Blacks Losing So Much Land?

Blacks do not lose their land because of an inability to farm efficiently. Black farmers do just as well or better than white farmers in gross return per acre. The net farm and farm-related income earned by black farmers per dollar value of land and buildings is almost 15 percent. The average for all farmers nationwide is 9 percent.

Blacks often lose their land, through voluntary or involuntary sales, because of factors beyond their control: insufficient capital to farm land; inadequate land utilization information and technical assistance; and unequal access to the market. These problems are often the result of past and current discrimination that black landowners face from both public and private lending institutions, legal bodies, the courts, and voracious land speculators representing oil, gas, paper, and timber industries.

Land use in America has taken a new turn in the 1980s. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States, as an industrial nation, was importing raw materials from abroad—Africa, Latin America, and Asia—on profitable terms. These raw materials were then converted into finished goods and sold back to developing nations. Since then, the terms of trade between the United States and developing Third World nations have changed, with many of these nations now dictating the price of their raw materials. Thus, new emphasis is being placed on the development of America's indigenous resources to lessen national dependence on resources from abroad.

Accordingly, there is a demand for land to produce energy, minerals, food, fiber, and other vital resources that were previously imported. Some estimate that for the United States to move to a point of self-sufficiency in energy alone, some 55 million acres in excess of what is currently available will be required. But rather than benefiting from this new demand, black landowners are in many cases subject to increasing pressures from large agribusinesses to relinquish their relatively small holdings. The situation is compounded for the black farmer/landowner in the Southeast, with its history of racial discrimination. This means that blacks are giving up what could be their best investment, at the very time that appreciation is beginning to accelerate.

The Emergency Land Fund

For the past 12 years, the Emergency Land Fund has been helping black families hold on to their farmland. ELF provides legal, technical, and financial assistance and counseling to poor, primarily black, rural landowners throughout the Southeast. ELF has also assisted Southeastern landowners who live outside the South. Over a 12 year period, ELF has helped more than 15,000 black families hold on to more than 150,000 acres of land with a value of at least $100 million.

The demand for land is increasing. And, in the Southeast, more agricultural land is being converted to nonagricultural uses than in other regions of the United States. Black landowners, who are often poor and lack sufficient technical and legal advice, are losing their land to expanding business and industry at an alarming rate. By the end of the 1980s, blacks may not own any part of America.

We need a more balanced landownership structure in America, rather than greater concentration of ownership in fewer and fewer hands, to ensure individual freedom and self-reliant families and communities.

. . . How Washington Won Chicago

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witty, and forceful, "winning" the debates even in the eyes of many whites. More to the point, the debates erased black doubts about Washington's qualifications and viability as a candidate.

During the primary campaign's final week, Byrne's support among both whites and blacks began to wither. Byrne forces resorted to race-baiting in a desperate attempt to halt Daley's inroads into the white vote. Cook County Chairman Ed Vrdolyak was quoted as telling a group of precinct captains to "save your city" from the possibility of a Washington victory. The effect was to drive black voters solidly into Washington's camp.

The black community was energized through a carefully promoted "crusade" atmosphere, and the success of that crusade could be seen in the election returns. The number of votes cast in the 17 predominantly black wards *doubled* over the 1979 mayoral primary, reaching a 73 percent turnout rate. According to an exit poll by WMAQ-TV, Washington received 84 percent of the black vote.

The General Election

Even many of Washington's ardent supporters were unprepared for his victory in the primary, but had he been a white candidate, the mayoral race would have ended with the city going through the motion of ratifying the Democratic party's choice. Chicago's racial animosities came to the forefront, however, and the little known Republican candidate, Bernard Epton, became known very quickly.

It was clear early on that the black vote would go overwhelmingly to Washington and the white ethnic vote would go heavily to Epton. Thus, the campaign was strongly shaped by efforts of both candidates to attract the white liberals concentrated on the North Side lakefront—the main swing vote in the election. For Washington, this meant a sharp transition from the primary strategy to a coalition-building strategy—a shift that was never convincingly accomplished.

Specific substantive issues were eclipsed throughout the campaign by two broad ones—the candidates' controversial personal lives and the future of machine politics. Washington's past legal problems and Epton's business dealings and mental health received considerable public attention—often, in Washington's case, as a substitute for the race issue.

Almost as potent an issue was Washington's pledge to eradicate machine politics and the patronage system. That threat created fears among many beneficiaries of the machine and provided powerful ward leaders with an incentive to join their rebelling constituencies in the stampede to the Republican side. Many observers considered Washington's refusal to make conciliatory gestures toward the machine leaders suicidal.

Yet any substantial overtures to the machine would also have been risky. Attempts to attract voters or even hold down turnout in the white ethnic wards would probably have proved futile. The pivotal block of white liberal voters, on the other hand, has always been an anti-machine vote in Chicago and might have turned against Washington if he had been perceived as offering to continue business as usual. The media were also alert for signs that Washington would follow Byrne's course of attaining victory by opposing the machine and then running the city by coopting it. A failure to pursue an anti-machine line might have jeopardized editorial support from the dailies.

Above all, however, the campaign was about race. It was race that made a credible Republican campaign possible.

This opening was exploited by the Epton campaign apparatus, whose television ads ended with the slogan "Epton for Mayor—Before It's Too Late." The ensuing weeks brought forth an appalling display of racial hatred. Buttons showed pictures of a watermelon with a black slash through it, slogans like "Vote Right, Vote White," or—the most direct statement of all—a plain white background. Leaflets warned that the white women would be raped, predicted that the CTA would be renamed "Soul Train," and claimed that Washington was a child molester. The harassment of Washington and Walter Mondale by white hecklers at St. Pascal's Church was broadcast worldwide.

While the most objectionable activities were generally independent of the Epton campaign, Epton himself brought the race issue to the forefront saying that he would be "ashamed" if a candidate with Washington's legal history were the best that "my minority" could produce (Epton is Jewish). For his part, Washington inflamed the situation by warning of a "race war" and suggesting that "some innocent person walking down the street may end up dead" if he were defeated.

Washington's later efforts to shift the campaign dialogue away from race to party failed to stem the flow of votes to Epton. By the Friday before the election, Washington's tracking polls found him pulling only 13 percent of the white vote. With victory in jeopardy, Washington's organization went into overdrive to pick up the crucial undecided bloc of "Lakefront liberals."

Paul Maslin, of Cambridge Survey Research, who did polling for Washington, says, "We had to say to the liberals, like it or not . . . the question is not whether you're a racist or not, but do you want to sanction a certain type of campaign and what that means to Chicago."

So emotional television spots were prepared for the final days. One commercial interspersed school children reciting the Pledge of Allegiance and scenes of the St. Pascal's incident. An even more controversial ad, shown only twice, began with the announcer's admonition, "There are moments in our history of which we are thoroughly and profoundly ashamed," as pictures of Selma, the Klan, and Martin Luther King's assassination flashed across the screen. "One of those moments may be happening in Chicago right now."

Did it work? A WMAQ-TV exit poll found Washington receiving 39 percent of the white liberal vote. According to that survey and another by WLS-TV, Washington recovered to around 17 or 18 percent

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Telescope

Black Appointed to Virginia Supreme Court

John Charles Thomas was sworn in on April 24, 1983 as the first black ever to serve on the Virginia Supreme Court.

The appointment represents yet another milestone in the career of the 32-year-old Thomas, who was named a partner in the prestigious Richmond law firm of Hunton and Williams just last year. A graduate of the University of Virginia law school, with an outstanding academic record, Thomas has acquired statewide recognition for his expertise in civil and commercial law. Because Thomas will be only 44 years old when his 12-year term expires, there is considerable speculation that he may ultimately be headed for either a political career or a seat on the federal bench. Another former partner in the Richmond law firm, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., was named to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972.

Thomas is one of several prominent blacks that Virginia Governor Charles Robb has appointed to state positions. Many experts credit Robb's election in 1981 to strong black support.

Rating Congress on Minority Issues

Congressional Education Associates (CEA) recently released its second annual ratings of congressional voting on issues of concern to blacks and Hispanics. The publication, known as the *CEA Congressional Ledger, 1983,* lists the votes for all U.S. Senators and House members on 20 key roll call votes during the 1982 (97th) session of Congress.

By CEA's reckoning, Congress as a whole "flunked" its voting survey. Out of a possible "perfect" score of 100, the average score was 50 for the Senate and 58 for the House. The 14 Democratic senators up for reelection in 1984 scored an average of 71; the average score for the 19 Republicans facing the electorate next year was 24.

Some of the most interesting ratings are for the Democratic presidential contenders. Heading the list is Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, with a perfect score of 100. Hart is followed by Senator Alan Cranston of California, with 85; Senator Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, with 65; and Senator John Glenn of Ohio, with 60. In the Republican field (should President Reagan decide to retire), Congressman Jack Kemp of New York heads the list, with a score of 40. He is followed by Senators Howard Baker of Tennessee and Bob Dole of Kansas, who tied with 30 apiece. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina is last with a ranking of 5.

The *Ledger* costs $5.00 and is available from Congressional Education Associates, 1411 K Street, N.W., Suite 801, Washington, D.C. 20005.

How Washington Won Chicago

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of the total white vote. That was not supposed to be enough to guarantee a win. But blacks cast 98 or 99 percent of their votes for Washington and appear to have exceeded even the record 82 percent turnout of registered voters citywide. Washington squeaked through by 40,000 votes out of 1.3 million cast.

Politics as Usual?

The abandonment of the Democratic party and its nominee by Chicago's whites was not entirely surprising. In almost all first-time, big-city black mayoral candidacies since the mid-1960s, whites have overwhelmingly refused to support the black candidate, precipitating a split within the Democratic party largely along racial lines.

Nonetheless, the virulence of white hostility displayed in Chicago was more symptomatic of the racially charged politics of a decade ago than of the more subtle racial politics of recent years.

The prospect of a black mayor need not tear a city apart. The relatively placid mayoral race in Philadelphia between ex-mayor Frank Rizzo and black opponent Wilson Goode is probably more representative of the future of American politics.

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